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I. Introduction 
 States might want to consider whether some form of value-added tax (VAT) 
may make sense for them for three quite different reasons.   
1) Taxing Sales. First, some states may simply be dissatisfied for various 
reasons with their existing sales taxes and interested in exploring the question is 
whether a VAT might be a better way to impose a state consumption tax.  They are 
right to be concerned whether their current retail sales taxes (RST) are doing the job, 
and as I argue in this paper a state value-added tax is more likely to be the right way 
to tax sales at the state level than seems to be recognized in most current U.S. 
discussion.1  Indeed, as I demonstrate below, a state VAT is both better in principle 
than even the best state retail sales tax (RST) and should be not much more difficult 
to administer in practice at the state level, although states with local sales taxes may 
have more problems.2  A principal reason why states should consider VAT as a 
possible replacement for an RST is to make themselves more competitive by 
removing the present distorting and undesirable tax on business imposed through 
RSTs.   
2) Taxing Business. Somewhat paradoxically, however, a second, and quite 
different, reason that some state (and/or local) governments may be interested in 
exploring some form of value-added taxation may be not because they do not want to 
remove a bad tax on business—which is essentially what substituting a VAT like that 
discussed in the present paper for an RST does—but rather because they want to tax 
business in a better way than through a corporate income tax or such other 
approaches to taxing business as differentially heavy real property taxes. If this is the 
question, a very different form of VAT—a low-rate ‘business value tax’ (BVT) 
imposed not on consumption but on production—may also be the answer in at least 
some cases.   As I have discussed at length in an earlier paper (Bird 2003), such a tax 
would both remove most of the well-known competitive distortions arising from 
business income taxes and provide a more stable source of state (and local) tax 
                                                          
1 Some parts of this paper draw on Bird and Gendron (2007).  I do not discuss here the question of 
coordinating a (hypothetical) state VAT with an equally hypothetical federal VAT: on this, see 
Bird, Mintz, and Wilson (2006) and, for an earlier view, Bird (2005a). 
2 I do not discuss the case of local sales taxes here: probably the only way such taxes could be 
administered is by ‘piggy-backing’ them on state taxes. 
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revenue. The only existing “state VATs” in the U.S.—Michigan’s Single Business 
Tax (SBT)3 and New Hampshire’s BET4—are in effect attempts to approximate to 
such a ‘business value-added tax’ rather than to the ‘conventional’ consumption VAT 
discussed in the present paper.  Such BVTs are both imposed on a different basis (in 
effect on production in the state, rather than consumption in the state) and 
administered in a different way (essentially on the basis of annual accounts, like an 
income tax, rather than on records of purchases and sales, like a sales tax) than what I 
call here—as it is called in about 150 countries around the world (Bird and Gendron 
2007)—‘the’ VAT.  Good arguments can be made for such BVT-type taxes as more 
sensible ways for state (and local) governments to tax business, if that is what they 
want to do, that through corporate income taxes, differentially heavy property taxes, 
or a variety of other ‘business-specific’ levies.5  Understandably, many concerned 
with U.S. state and local finance think of the Michigan and New Hampshire 
experiences when they think of state VATs, but they are quite wrong to do so.  Those 
taxes are worth thinking about and perhaps to some extent emulating when it comes 
to taxing local business.  But they in no way resemble the kind of VAT that should be 
thought of replace a state sales tax, as I discuss below.6   
                                                          
3 First introduced in 1953 as the ‘business activities tax’ and abolished in 1967 (Ebel 1972), this 
tax was reintroduced in 1976 (ACIR 1978) and in still in force, although in an increasingly 
complex, and unpopular, form (Kenyon 1996).  Currently, its final demise is scheduled for the end 
of this year, although as Hamilton (2007) correctly suggests, one can easily make the case that this 
is yet another example of doing the wrong thing for the wrong reasons—something that all too 
commonly seems to occur when initially rational proposals are churned around in the inherently 
emotive political cauldron within which tax policy is ultimately determined.    
4 See Kenyon (1996) and Arnold and Ardinger (2004). 
5 In Canada, for example, Bird and Mintz (2000) and Bird and McKenzie (2001) have discussed 
the desirability of replacing the existing provincial corporate income taxes by a BVT: this 
proposal was viewed favorably in at least one province (Alberta Business Tax Review Committee 
2000). 
6 As mentioned in the text, the BVT is discussed in detail in Bird (2003).  Some might wonder if it 
can possibly make sense to impose two quite different levies – the BVT and the VAT—on what, 
from some perspectives, is the same base—“value-added” or, essentially, the difference between 
the amount a firm sells and the amount it buys from other (taxpaying) firms.  As the Meade report 
(1978) showed long ago, when it, in effect, recommended exactly such a system for Britain, it 
certainly can make sense: the two taxes are actually imposed on different bases (one on 
consumption and the other—preferably at a very low rate—on production) and collected through a 
different system (one like an income tax through annual returns and the other like a sales tax based 
on business activities within a shorter tax period like a month or a quarter). 
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3) Replacing Other Taxes. A third question sometimes raised with respect to 
VAT in the state context—for example, recently in Georgia7—is quite different from 
the preceding two.  It is whether a state VAT might be introduced to not to improve 
and rationalize existing state taxes on either consumption (RST) or business (CIT) 
but rather to replace taxes that are completely different in rationale, in operation, and 
in effects, such as the personal income tax or the property tax.  If this is the question, 
then a VAT in any form is unlikely to be the right answer.  As I have recently argued 
at length elsewhere—admittedly in a different context, but much the same arguments 
can readily be applied to the state-local setting—both the personal income tax (Bird 
and Zolt 2005) and the property tax (Bird and Slack 2004) have important and 
distinct roles to play in financing government.  Even the best VAT cannot play these 
roles effectively.   
 Of course, personal income taxes and residential property taxes are often 
unpopular both with citizens who have to pay them and with politicians who have to 
listen to citizens complaining about them.  Life would be a lot simpler for politicians 
at all levels if they did not have to justify their expenditures to people who were all 
too conscious of the fact that they, the people, had to pay for them.  Unfortunately for 
all concerned, however, the fiscal task of government is essentially to provide people 
with the public services they are willing to pay for, and there is no way to get this 
equation right—to ensure adequate fiscal accountability—without requiring their 
political representatives to face taxpayers with the bills. Local governments that do 
not have to impose visible (and painful) local taxes on homes, like state governments 
that do not have to impose visible (and painful) state taxes on income and 
consumption are arguably less likely to be ‘good’ governments in the long run than 
those that have to impose and defend both such taxes and what they do with the 
proceeds.  Hiding the fiscal cost of government spending by hiding taxes from 
citizens and pretending you are taxing someone else is not a practice that should be 
encouraged.   
 
                                                          
7 The reference is to HR 900 introduced in the state legislature in the 2007 session (Sjoquist 2007). 
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II. Taxing Consumption: VAT vs. the Alternatives 
 The question considered in this paper is thus the limited but important one of 
whether a state sales tax can or should take the ‘radical’ form of a VAT rather than 
the well-trodden RST route.  Since there are essentially are only three types of 
general sales taxes—a turnover tax, a single-stage sales tax, and a VAT—and the first 
of these in the form of the ‘gross receipts tax’ has also shown some recent signs of 
life at the state level,8 I begin by considering briefly the salient differences between 
these three approaches to sales taxation.9   
 
Turnover (Gross Receipts) Tax  
 A turnover tax is in some ways the easiest sales tax to administer.  Tell me 
your turnover, and I’ll tax you on it.  A tax can be levied on ‘turnover’ (gross sales 
receipts) as estimated by tax officials or even as self-reported by taxpayers, as is often 
done with respect to local business taxes, for example (Bird 2003).  In either case, the 
basic administrative problem is to determine and verify the turnover (sales) of a 
taxpayer and to collect the tax.   
 The task is simple.  Its execution can be difficult.  For example, the basic way 
to evade such a tax is simple: hide (under-report) sales.  The easiest way to avoid a 
turnover tax legally is by integrating vertically with one’s suppliers since ‘within-
firm’ sales are not taxed.  For example, transactions between firm A and firm B are 
taxed: but if A and B merge, even though nothing else changes, taxes do, because 
intra-firm transactions are not taxed.  Such tax-induced mergers are not economically 
desirable.  Quite apart from this problem, a turnover tax is by far the economically 
most distorting form of sales tax.  For example, sales of investment as well as 
consumption  goods  are  taxed.   Out-of-state  sales  (exports)  are  also  often   taxed.   
                                                          
8 See Giertz (2007) on Illinois and Mikesell (2007) for a judicious recent review and critique of 
this ancient levy. 
9 I do not discuss here the case for taxing consumption in general, the arguments for and against 
doing so through ‘direct’ taxes vs. ‘indirect’ taxes, or the case for imposing consumption taxes at 
the state level. The starting point for this paper is simply the observation that 90 percent of states 
currently impose such taxes, and the question I ask is essentially whether they are doing so in the 
best way possible.   
Is a State VAT the Answer? What’s the Question?   
 
 
 5
Those who may wish, for some unknowable reason, to discourage exports and 
investment and to induce firms to integrate up and down the chain of distribution and 
production may perhaps welcome the effects of such a tax.  Those who are interested 
in being economically competitive should not.  
 Since the final tax burden borne by any particular transaction depends 
essentially on how many prior taxed transactions are embodied in its sales price, few 
are likely to understand either its final effects on prices or its distributional impact.  
Governments that impose turnover taxes have little idea of the effects of such taxes 
on either allocation or distribution.  Of course, neither do taxpayers know what’s 
really going on—a result that some politicians may applaud but that anyone 
interested in fiscal accountability should presumably deplore. About 60 years ago,  
turnover taxes—which date back at least to the 14th century Spanish alcabala  but 
whose ‘modern’ revival came when Germany financed World War I with a turnover 
tax known as the Umsatzsteurer (Due, 1957)—were relatively common around the 
world.  Since then, however, they have been abandoned almost everywhere and 
replaced by the VAT, as discussed below. 
 
The Retail Sales Tax (RST) 
 In some ways, the world-wide (outside the U.S.) triumph of the VAT over the 
turnover tax is perhaps a bit surprising.  If one is concerned to avoid the undesirable 
effects of the gross-receipts (turnover) approach noted above, a more obvious 
solution is to impose a single-stage sales tax—a retail sales tax (RST)—on the final 
sale to consumers (households, or non-registered firms), as was done in most U.S. 
states gradually in the decades following the introduction of the first such tax in 
Mississippi in 1932 (Due and Mikesell, 1994).10  With such a tax, investment goods 
purchased by registered firms, like other inputs purchased for business purposes, are 
in principle free from tax, as are exports.  The effects of such a tax are much clearer 
than those of a turnover tax.  The government can figure out what it is doing.  
Taxpayers at least know that they are being taxed.  
                                                          
10  In principle, other forms of single-stage sales taxes imposed prior to the retail level may exist, 
but few now do anywhere in the world, and all such pre-retail taxes – except, of course, the 
VAT—suffer from the problems long ago analyzed by Due (1957). 
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 Unfortunately, experience with RSTs in the U.S. (and elsewhere) 
demonstrates that this promising approach has two fatal practical flaws when it comes 
to cleaning up the ‘gross-receipts act.’  First, it is extremely difficult to ensure that 
inter-firm purchases used to produce taxable goods and services—and only those 
purchases—are exempt from tax.  The ‘ring’ (or suspension) system used to achieve 
this result with an RST—under which tax is ‘suspended’ on sales by one registered 
firm to another and so on, and on, until there is a sale to someone outside the ring of 
registrants—is as difficult to set up in such a way as to free all business inputs from 
tax as it is cumbersome to police and easy to abuse.  The result, as Ring (1999) 
shows, is that a substantial share of state ‘retail sales’ taxes in reality fall in the first 
instance not on consumers but on producers. In other words, even the best RST 
inevitably contains a significant ‘turnover tax’ element and thus imposes some tax 
burden on both investment and exports.   
 The second problem with an RST is that the entire tax collection process rests 
on the least dependable link in the chain—the final sale to a consumer (that is, to 
someone outside the ring of licensed firms).  The fragmented and usually small-
business-dominated retail trade sector is always and everywhere difficult for even the 
best tax administration to police effectively, but unless it is so policed, states run the 
risk of losing a substantial fraction of their sales tax base to evasion. Due and 
Mikesell (1994) estimated over a decade ago that states were losing perhaps 3 percent 
of their potential sales tax revenue owing to audit deficiencies.  As Bruce and Fox 
(2004) show, the recent growth of e-commerce has greatly exacerbated the 
enforcement problem with state RSTs.    
 Hence the dilemma: turnover taxes are easy to administer but have bad 
economic effects; single-stage retail sales taxes in theory may avoid these bad effects 
but in practice they never do so very well owing to the administrative problems 
(discussed further below) that make it difficult to exclude business inputs from tax. 
Enter the VAT.  
 
The Value-Added Tax (VAT) 
  In principle—and, when properly set up and run, in practice—a VAT 
combines the good features of both its competitors in the sales tax game while 
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avoiding most of their bad features.  How does it do this?  Essentially, through two 
features:11   
First, as shown in Table 1, VAT imposes what is economically equivalent to a 
single-stage retail sales tax through a multi-stage process that in effect ‘withholds’ tax 
at each stage of the chain of production and distribution preceding the final sale to 
households. By doing so, in the end it achieves the (presumed) goal of taxing only 
consumption.  Moreover, even if evasion occurs at the final retail stage only that part 
of the potential tax base consisting of the retail margin escapes tax.   
 
TABLE 1.  VAT COMPARED TO RSTA  (BOTH LEVIED AT 5%) 
  
 
 
 
Sales 
Purchases 
of Inputs 
from 
other 
Sellers 
 
 
VAT 
on 
Sales 
Credit 
for 
Tax 
on 
Inputs 
 
 
Net 
VAT 
Paid 
 
 
 
RST 
Paid 
Sales of Inputs by Taxpaying 
Firms to Manufacturer 
$50.00 None $2.50 None $2.50 $2.50 
Sale by Manufacturer to 
Wholesaler 
$100.00* $50.00* $5.00 $2.50 $2.50  
Sale by Wholesaler to Retailer $200.00* $100.00* $10.00 $5.00 $5.00  
Sale by Retailer to Final 
Consumer 
$400.00* $200.00* $20.00 $10.00 $10.00 $20.00*
Total tax collected     $20.00 $22.50*
AThe figures marked by an asterisk in Table 1 assume that the RST paid on the initial inputs is not 
passed forward in the later transactions.  If it is instead fully passed forward, the initial sale price by the 
manufacturer would be $102.50, and if everyone in the distribution chain (as in this example) in effect 
‘marked up’ their input prices by 100 percent, the price charged to the retailer by the wholesaler would 
then be $205.00, and that charged by the retailer would be $410.00.  The RST due (at 5%) on the final 
sale would then be $20.50 and the total tax incorporated in the final consumer price would be $23.00. 
 
                                                          
11 Throughout this paper, I assume that VAT is administered—as indeed it almost invariably is in 
the real world when it is applied as a consumption tax—by what is called the ‘invoice-credit’ 
system of subtracting taxes paid on inputs (including the purchases of such capital goods as 
machinery and equipment) from taxes due on sales in order to calculate the net payment to be 
remitted to (or refund to be claimed from) the government: see the example in Table 1.  In 
contrast, the BVT mentioned in the introduction is usually administered by what is called the 
‘addition’ method of adding up the payments made for inputs such as wages and benefits for labor 
and interest, rent, and profits for capital.  For further discussion, and a demonstration of the 
similarities and differences of these different tax bases (and other variants), see such standard 
works as Tait (1988) and Ebrill et al. (2001).   
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Secondly, as also shown in Table 1, because it credits taxes on inputs 
(including capital goods) against taxes due on sales at each level, VAT avoids 
discouraging investment and distorting economic choices with respect to production 
technology.  Similarly, VAT eliminates taxes on exports by crediting taxes paid on 
inputs at prior stages. In contrast, if a manufacturer (or other seller) buys goods from 
a firm subject to the RST, the final sale is in effect subject to the RST on these inputs 
as well as that applied to the final sale itself, as shown in the last column of Table 1.  
 With an RST, as with a turnover tax, the basic way to evade is simply to 
avoid reporting sales.  This can be done by remaining in the shadow economy, by not 
keeping proper books, or by not reporting correctly to the tax authority.  It takes only 
one to evade.  With VAT, however, there are two ways to evade: by under-reporting 
sales or by over-reporting taxable purchases (thus claiming excess input tax credits 
and, in some cases, even refunds).  On the other hand, with VAT it also takes two to 
evade—a seller and a buyer.  Moreover, since the two sides of the transaction are (for 
inter-business trade) in principle recorded in two sets of books, the task of the 
administration in detecting evasion should be easier with VAT. 
 Indeed, the task of the taxman is made even simpler with a VAT when it 
comes to sales among businesses because the two parties involved in any potentially 
taxable transaction (buyer and seller) have conflicting incentives.  Buyers want to 
overstate purchase prices to inflate credits, while sellers want to understate sales to 
reduce output taxes.  For this reason, some early writers even claimed that VAT was 
at least to some extent ‘self-enforcing’ (National Economic Development Office 
1969).  In reality, however, this apparent strength of VAT has in some instances 
proven to be a weakness since it seems to have induced some countries to rely too 
heavily on tax design (the VAT approach to sales taxation). This is a mistake: good 
tax design can make good administration easier, as indeed a VAT does, but it cannot 
substitute for good administration.  No matter how cleverly a tax may be designed, if 
it is not enforced properly those who want to cheat will soon find ways to do so.   
 A major form of VAT evasion now drawing much attention in the European 
Union (E.U.), for example, capitalizes on the central operational feature of VAT, 
namely, its collection in stages—as it were, by ‘withholding’ tax on the ‘value added’ 
(sales less purchases) by each firm in the production-distribution chain.  What 
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happens is simply that a firm creates a ‘shell’ company and then ‘sells’ inputs to itself 
at a false price that then serves as the basis for an input tax credit or refund claim.12  It 
is easier to get away with this dodge when the alleged supplier is in another country 
as in the case of the so-called ‘carousel’ frauds in the E.U. (Sinn, Gebauer, and 
Parsche 2004). Of course, when tax administration is weak it is not difficult to create 
and register fictitious firms within a single jurisdiction in order to operate similar 
frauds.  Some countries have reacted to such practices by such measures as 
disallowing refunds with respect to capital purchases by new firms until a reasonable 
pattern of economic activity has been established (e.g. for a year).13  Interestingly, 
Ainsworth (2005) has suggested that the E.U. may have something to learn with 
respect to verifying inter-jurisdictional transactions from some recent U.S. experience 
with computerized administrative systems.14  
 No tax is perfect, either in design or administration.  Nonetheless, regardless 
of the competence or otherwise of the tax administration and the honesty or otherwise 
of taxpayers, both in principle and practice evidence around the world suggests 
strongly that it is simpler to enforce a sales tax applied in an incremental ‘value-
added’ form to a chain of transactions than it is to administer an ‘equivalent’ RST, 
where all stands or falls on honest reporting of a single transaction (the final sale).  
The main lesson that has been learned in the more than 100 countries that have a 
VAT is clear: if you have a VAT, keep it.15 
                                                          
12 The procedure just described can of course also be used to manipulate inter-company transfer 
prices to reduce profits taxes in a particular jurisdiction.  Indeed, when VAT exists in a country it 
is not uncommon for tax authorities to use VAT audits to uncover evidence of non-arm’s length 
transfer prices between members of the same corporate group.  Corporate tax and VAT audits thus 
overlap to a considerable extent. 
13 The denial or delay of export refunds on sales to out-of-state buyers is another and even less 
attractive response. For a review of international practice with respect to VAT refunds, see 
Harrison and Krelove (2005). 
14 Ainsworth (2007) notes the existence of similar ‘missing trader’ frauds in Canada with respect 
to provincial sales taxes (whether they take the form of VATs or RSTs) although such frauds 
appear to be relatively minor in E.U. terms, perhaps because, as Bird and Gendron (1998) suggest, 
there is an over-riding federal VAT that makes within-country out-of-province sales easier to 
trace.  In practice, the E.U. has to date attempted to deal with such problems mainly by 
strengthening its information exchange service (VIES), as discussed by Verwaal and Cnossen 
(2002). 
15 For further discussion of this point, see Bird and Gendron (2006).  Of course, since (as 
discussed below) VAT is a relatively complex and costly tax from both administrative and 
compliance perspectives, this advice presumes that the initial adoption of VAT pays for itself in 
both revenue and efficiency terms, as I shall discuss.  
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However, no U.S. state now has a VAT—or at least not a ‘real’ VAT in the 
sense of a full-fledged tax on consumption.   Should states consider adopting a VAT?  
If it’s good enough for countries from Belgium to Brazil and Japan to Jamaica, as 
well as such Canadian provinces as Quebec and Nova Scotia, is it good enough for 
Georgia or Minnesota? The path of the pioneer is of course never easy, but in fact not 
all that much pioneering is needed.  Perhaps this truth has not been fully grasped in 
part because the precise nature of the change involved in moving from an RST to a 
VAT seems not to have been clearly understood in some of the limited U.S. 
discussion of this possibility to date, and many of the arguments commonly heard 
against considering this option seriously are wrong or at least misleading.  For 
example, mention is often made of Michigan and New Hampshire as ‘VAT 
experiences’ from which other states might learn.  As already mentioned, however, in 
fact the type of ‘VAT’ applied in those states in no way resembles the VAT discussed 
in the present paper: instead, these taxes illustrate the alternative BVT approach to 
tapping a similar ‘value-added’ basis as a replacement or supplement to a corporate 
income tax. 
As another example, economists are fond of emphasizing the conceptual 
equivalence of VAT and RST.  They are of course right to do so: provided that the 
tax base is identical and that each is equally well administered, the two are essentially 
alternative ways of imposing the same thing—a tax on consumption.16  Those who 
start from this point commonly conclude that the choice between the two therefore 
turns essentially on which can be better administered in the particular setting in 
question. Unfortunately, too often those who argue this way immediately leap to a 
conclusion that is little more than a variant of the ‘old tax is a good tax’ shibboleth, 
namely, that since the base is “the same” then shifting from an RST to a VAT is 
unlikely to be worthwhile given the transition costs and the very ‘different’ 
administration required.  This conclusion both underplays the real economic and 
administrative advantages of a VAT and overestimates how ‘different’ VAT 
                                                          
16 For a rigorous comparison of a VAT and a retail sales tax (RST) as well as with a 
manufacturers’ level tax and a turnover tax in a simplified setting see Das-Gupta and Gang (1996).  
This article shows that such comparisons are sensitive to conditions in both intermediate and final 
goods markets.  Such subtleties are ignored here.    
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administration is from RST administration.  I develop these points in the next few 
sections. 
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III. VAT vs. RST: The Economics of Tax Choice 
 
If two taxes tax the same base equally effectively, they are obviously 
equivalent in an economically relevant sense.  However, this argument tells us little 
about the real-world comparison of VAT and RST because the bases of a VAT and 
an RST are most unlikely to be equivalent.  This point is critical because the 
economic effects of a tax depend primarily on the size and nature of its base.  The 
size of the tax base determines the rate needed to generate any given revenue, and the 
precise nature of the base determines both effects on economic efficiency and how 
well the tax can be administered in any given setting.  The two most important and 
critical differences between VAT and RST are the extent to which services are taxed 
and the extent to which business inputs are ‘untaxed.’  In principle, such differences 
need not exist.  In practice, however, they almost invariably do, as I discuss next.   
 
Business Inputs 
  
 Why Inputs Should Not Be Taxed 
 
 There are a number of reasons, persuasive at least to economists, for not 
taxing business inputs under a consumption tax.  The first and in many ways the 
critical argument is simply that since, by definition, only consumers consume then 
only consumers should be subject to a consumption tax.  To the extent that some 
‘consumption’ tax in fact falls on intermediate production inputs, the actual burden 
imposed on final consumption will vary in proportion to the extent such inputs are 
used in producing final consumption goods.  The resulting uneven pattern of tax 
incidence is unlikely to accord with any policy intention.  Consumption choices will 
be altered and market efficiency reduced.  In addition, taxes on inputs affect 
production efficiency by altering the choice of inputs and perhaps even the choice of 
production techniques—for example, by delaying new investment owing to the 
Is a State VAT the Answer? What’s the Question?   
 
 
 13
higher cost of capital equipment.17  The result is to reduce not only economic 
efficiency but also investment and growth.18   
 Further reasons for ‘untaxing’ business inputs are not hard to find.  For 
instance, since most firms are too small to influence the prices of goods sold to other 
jurisdictions, to the extent that taxes on production inputs are not rebated on exports 
the relative profitability of exporting is reduced.  Consequently, the export base of the 
taxing state is smaller than it would otherwise be.19  Moreover, because firms can 
generally avoid such ‘cascading’ taxes if they produce inputs themselves, as 
mentioned earlier an undesirable incentive is created for mergers between firms doing 
business with each other.  Even the size and structure of productive organizations 
may thus be affected by consumption taxes that are not confined to taxing 
consumption.  Finally, and perhaps most politically relevant in the context of many 
states, it is clear that firms located in jurisdictions that impose relatively heavier taxes 
on business inputs are clearly penalized relative to firms in areas that tax such inputs 
less heavily.  Why any state should want, so to speak, to shoot itself in the foot by 
thus hampering the competitiveness of its firms is not clear: yet this is exactly what 
an RST does, and as I discuss next, the evidence from Canada, where four provinces 
have recently adopted VATs, suggests that these effects may be significant.   
 For example, one recent study of the province of Ontario – which still has an 
RST—found that removing the ‘cascading’ effect of the provincial (retail) sales tax 
on business would have a larger marginal incentive effect on new investment than 
would lowering the provincial corporate income tax from 12.5 percent  to 8 percent 
(Chen and Mintz 2003).  That is, changing from RST to VAT would reduce the tax 
costs of new investment in the province by more than would a cut of one-third in the 
provincial corporate tax. In a subsequent and more extensive study Chen, Mintz and 
Tarasov (2007) found that the five provinces that still have RSTs in Canada are, in 
                                                          
17 The classical argument on the importance of not distorting input prices and hence creating 
production inefficiencies is Diamond and Mirrlees (1971).  While there are ‘second-best’ 
exceptions to this rule, they do not seem very persuasive (Keen 2006).  
18 Incidentally, Americans may (or may not) be amused to learn that initially China’s VAT did not 
allow input credits for capital goods precisely in order to discourage investment (Wong and Bird 
2007). Consider the trade balance if they had done it right! 
19 Even if taxed firms can shift some tax to foreign (out-of-state) buyers, the same result ensues 
unless demand is completely inelastic.  (For discussion of the international case, taking exchange 
rates into account, see Bird and Gendron 2007).  
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effect, raising the marginal effective tax rates (METR) they impose on capital 
investment by at least 32 percent—and in one case by an astounding 199 percent!20  
In contrast, the four provinces with VATs impose no such tax on investment (with a 
very minor exception for Quebec, which imposes some limits on input credits 
claimed by very large firms).  The additional tax burdens imposed by RSTs on 
business inputs were particularly heavy with respect to communications, 
construction, and non-trade services.   
 The fact that RSTs end up imposing surprisingly substantial taxes on capital 
investment is important. About a decade ago, four Canadian provinces moved from 
RSTs to VATs.  As a recent detailed analysis by Smart (2007) shows, the result of 
this tax shift was an increase in investment in machinery and equipment in those 
provinces of about 12 percent.  As anyone who has worked on interstate tax 
competition will recognize, this number is not small: indeed, some advocates of 
investment incentives at the state level might be willing to kill to produce such 
results.  It is thus not surprising that many in Canada have recently been urging the 
remaining RST provinces to move to VATs.21    
 
Why Business Inputs are Taxed 
 
Despite this strong economic and competitive case for ‘untaxing’ investment 
(and other business inputs), experience in both Canada and the U.S. demonstrates that 
there are also reasons why inputs should be taxed that often seem to have proved 
persuasive in the political arena.  The major reason is simply because there is a lot of 
potential revenue in taxing business inputs.  Many U.S. states and Canadian 
provinces collect between a third and half of RST revenues from such inputs (Ring 
                                                          
20 The marginal effective tax rate is a calculation designed to measure incentives for investment: it 
takes into account the effects of the measurement and timing of income in order to estimate the 
taxes that are applied to an additional dollar of capital income (Fullerton 2005).  The extreme case 
mentioned in the text is the small province of Prince Edward Island which (1) imposes the only 
provincial RST that actually includes the federal GST in its base, (2) unlike some other provinces, 
imposes no capital tax, (3) has a very low provincial corporate income tax and (4) benefits from a 
negative federal corporate income tax rate owing to the impact of federal regional subsidy policy. 
21 In addition to the studies already cited see e.g. Bird and Wilson (2004), Dahlby (2005), and 
Smart and Bird (2007).  A recent federal CGE study (Baylor and Beausejour 2004) points in the 
same direction, noting that the marginal cost of raising a dollar in provincial revenue through the 
substantial share of RSTs imposed on capital is about $2.30 compared to only $1.13 if the same 
dollar were raised by a VAT. 
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1999; Kuo, McGirr, and Poddar 1988).  Clearly, if these items are excluded from the 
tax base (as they are with VAT) then it seems obvious that to meet any particular 
revenue target either the tax rate has to be higher or the tax base has to be expanded.22  
It seems obvious; but it may, as Smart (2007) shows, be wrong.  Indeed, his detailed 
calculations of the fiscal effects of substituting VAT for RST in the five Canadian 
provinces that still have RSTs suggest that no rate increase would be necessary.  Of 
course, this result to some extent reflects certain specific features of the Canadian 
system (such as the application of VAT to the sale of new houses) that may not be 
applicable in other circumstances, so any state considering such a change would of 
course have to do its own calculations.  
Whatever the detailed numbers may show, however, it is always politically 
attractive to tax something vague called ‘business’—usually understood to mean ‘the 
rich’ or at least ‘someone other than me’—rather than final consumption, which all 
too obviously means ‘me’ to most voters.  The political challenge of persuading 
voters that ‘untaxing’ business through a move to a VAT is more likely to produce 
more jobs than it is more taxes is not likely to be easy.  On the other hand, no 
attention should be paid to the common assertion that it is administratively complex 
to ‘untax’ business inputs under VAT.  Indeed, it is complex to do so … under an 
RST.  One important reason that so many countries have adopted a VAT in recent 
decades is precisely because it is hard to relieve business inputs effectively from tax 
with any other form of sales tax.  The remainder of this section develops these points.  
 
Untaxing Inputs under RST 
 
Viewed from a strictly economic perspective business inputs should clearly 
be  ‘untaxed’  under  any decent consumption tax.  Two ways are used to achieve this  
                                                          
22 In the long run, if one accepts the Diamond-Mirrlees (1971) approach, presumably taxing 
business inputs will of course reduce potential revenue – though governments seldom look that far 
ahead.  On the other hand, some might want to tax some business inputs such as fuel if they are 
associated with externalities and, as Bird (2003) suggests, one can argue that to some extent such 
taxation may even be viewed as a sort of ‘generalized user charge.’ These and many other subtle 
points are being left aside here both to keep things simple and to keep the reader’s eye on what 
matters most in (potential) state VAT practice: taxing inputs is ‘anti-competitive.’ 
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objective with RSTs. First, the definition of ‘taxable sale’ found in most RST 
jurisdictions excludes ‘sales for resale.’  While it is not always clear exactly what this 
term means, the usual interpretation excludes from tax goods that are physically 
incorporated into other goods that are then in turn sold for final consumption—e.g. 
wood used to build a desk.  There are, however, many borderline cases (consumables 
and fuel, containers, repairs and maintenance, construction, etc.) and the tax treatment 
of many of these items varies widely under RSTs from state to state (Due and 
Mikesell 1994).  
Secondly, some products, notably machinery and equipment, may be 
specifically exempt from tax.  For instance, the exemption approach is often applied 
to major agricultural inputs (feed, seed, fertilizer, agricultural equipment) under the 
RST.  The scope and nature of RST exemptions vary considerably from state to state, 
but they are generally administered by requiring the purchaser to provide to the seller 
an official certificate of exemption—a document certifying that the buyer is a 
registered vendor and showing its sales tax registration number.  As a rule, the 
purchaser is held liable for any misuse of this exemption—for example, if she makes 
a tax-free purchase that is not for resale or not used for legitimate business purposes.  
Some states require similar certificates for purchases of industrial equipment and 
even in a few cases for tax-free purchases of agricultural inputs—although farmers 
are seldom if ever registered for sales tax purposes.  The purpose of such certificates 
is to facilitate control by providing a more complete ‘paper trail’ for sales tax 
auditors.  The efficacy of this system depends entirely on the quantity and quality of 
sales tax audit.  The strength of this pillar of the RST generally leaves much to be 
desired.23  
 In addition to exemptions by product and use, there are also many ‘exempt 
purchasers’ in the form of a wide variety of both public sector and non-profit 
organizations.  The tax status of non-profit entities is a complex and difficult issue 
under a VAT (Gendron 2005).  It is arguably more so under an RST—or it would be 
if such taxes were ever enforced to VAT standards.  Ideally, for full audit control, 
exempt purchasers should also be registered and their registration numbers quoted on 
                                                          
23 One thorough review concluded that “most states need to at least double their audit staffs, 
increasing their audit coverage threefold to maximize revenue” (Due and Mikesell 1994, p.244). 
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the relevant invoices.  No U.S. state appears to do this.24  Indeed, some states do not 
even register non-retail enterprises (manufacturers and wholesalers) that make 
occasional taxable sales, although again such registration is necessary for control over 
purchases for resale.  The theoretically correct solution, although not necessarily the 
most cost-efficient, would be to register more, not fewer, entities under either RST or 
VAT.  However, owing to the ability of registered firms to purchase many items tax 
free and the difficulty of distinguishing ‘business’ from ‘personal’ use, most U.S. 
states seem more concerned to limit sales tax registrants to reduce over-registration 
than to expand their number to deal with under-registration (Due and Mikesell 
1994).25 
Sales of taxable goods and services that take place within the ‘ring’ of those 
holding registration (or exemption) certificates escape RST.  RST applies only when 
sales are made to those outside this magic circle—that is, to final consumers or, 
perhaps (and by no means unimportantly) to unregistered or ‘informal’ producers. 
This approach is obviously potentially subject to abuse—e.g., by using equipment 
such as vehicles or computers purchased for businesses for personal purposes.  A so-
called ‘use tax’ exists to capture such personal use but is not very effective.26  In part 
because of the considerable potential for abuse, in practice most RSTs restrict the 
operation of the suspension system in a number of ways—e.g. excluding certain 
products (such as vehicles or personal computers).27   
 No state RST comes close to excluding all tax elements from the price of 
business inputs (Ring 1999).  It cannot be done even though, as discussed below, 
most RSTs exclude most important services in addition to permitting a wide variety 
of other exemptions and exclusions with the result that many business purchases are 
not subject to tax in the first place.  To the extent that exempt and excluded activities 
incorporate taxed elements—even accountants and consultants use computers, desks, 
                                                          
24 Nor do those Canadian provinces with RSTs.  Since many non-profit activities are registered 
under the federal VAT (the GST) in principle such provinces could use the GST number for 
control purposes but none seem to do so. 
25 As noted elsewhere, similar concerns arise with a VAT because a registered firm can make a 
false claim for input tax credits.  It is thus important to ensure that only legitimate enterprises are 
registered. 
26 Due and Mikesell (1994) discuss the use tax in some detail, setting out the different ways in 
which it operates in different U.S. states and its widely varying importance in revenue terms.   
27 Due and Mikesell (1994, chap. 3) discuss state treatment of production inputs in detail. 
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and pencils that are taxed, for instance—even nominally untaxed business inputs 
generally incorporate some tax element.  The fees a firm pays for accounting services 
may thus be $100 higher because the accountant is passing on the RST he has paid on 
various inputs.  The firm in turn incorporates this additional $100 in its cost base in 
determining the price it charges for its own product, assuming it can pass the tax on 
fully.   
 The tax that is paid by the final consumer on any product thus depends not 
simply on the RST explicitly levied on the final price but also on the extent to which 
that price incorporates earlier taxes levied in the production process.28  Depending on 
market conditions, in some instances the producer may absorb some tax costs, thus 
reducing profitability and making investment less attractive.  If such costs impinge on 
the acquisition of new capital, business in the taxing state may be put at a competitive 
disadvantage with respect to competitors located in other countries and regions.29  If 
such costs reduce the profitability of exporting, the export base of the taxing 
jurisdiction will be disadvantaged.  The extent to which and the manner in which the 
hidden taxes imposed by the RST cascade down the production-distribution chain 
thus distorts consumption and production decisions, alters the distributive impact of 
the tax in a complex way, and reduces economic efficiency, investment, and growth 
in the economy as a whole. 
 
Untaxing Inputs under VAT 
  
 From the perspective of tax design, a principal reason for adopting a VAT is 
precisely because it reduces many of the (presumably unintended) consequences 
arising because of the impossibility of freeing business inputs from tax under an RST.  
The extent of the multi-faceted distortions resulting from the RST approach to sales 
                                                          
28 Smart (2007) demonstrates that in the case of Canada changes in the effective rate of provincial 
sales taxes—whether resulting from changes in taxes on final or intermediate sales—appear to be 
fully shifted forward to consumers.  In contrast, most U.S. sales tax incidence studies appear to 
assume that taxes falling on business inputs are borne by business owners (Mazerov 2002).   
While not further discussed here, this issue obviously needs to be looked at more closely. 
29 As mentioned in the previous note, this appears to be the common assumption in U.S. studies.  
If the taxes on business inputs are fully shifted forward (as Smart (2007) argues) then, over time, 
as resources shift in response to demand shifts reflecting price differentials, such disadvantages 
may be reduced.  Even in the international context, however, when exchange rates can also adjust, 
such effects are unlikely to be offset fully (Bird and Gendron 2007). 
Is a State VAT the Answer? What’s the Question?   
 
 
 19
taxation is difficult to assess, but one conclusion is clear: VAT is less distorting 
because its principal economic effect is to reduce substantially the taxation of 
business inputs.  Precisely because VAT is first charged on most inputs and then later 
offset against output VAT arising later in the production-distribution chain, the result 
in the end is that no additional tax element is included in the VAT levied on the sale 
to the final consumer.  Sellers deduct VAT previously paid on inputs (including 
purchases of capital goods) before remitting VAT due on sales.  From an economic 
perspective, this ability of VAT to ‘untax’ business is one of its most attractive 
features: VAT is the form of consumption tax that comes closest to taxing 
consumption at the explicit tax rate stated in the law.  It is also the least distorting 
form of sales tax and imposes the lowest barriers to investment and growth.   
 
Taxing Services 
 
 Of course, untaxing business inputs reduces the tax base.  Even if in the end 
the result is more growth, the immediate result may be that the tax rate has to be 
increased to raise a given amount of revenue, and higher tax rates of course create 
more economic distortions than lower rates.  Fortunately for government revenues, 
most VATs expand the tax base from the usual goods-oriented RST base to 
encompass a much wider range of services.  ‘Services’ take many forms.  Some are 
ancillary or incidental to the production or supply of goods while others (e.g. 
‘personal services’) stand alone.  In many cases the line between goods and services 
is thin, and taxes that fall only on ‘goods’ are open to abuse and can be 
administratively intractable.30  The recent growth of digital technology has blurred 
this line even more.  As Bird (2005b) notes, VAT does not resolve these problems, 
but it does make them more manageable than they are under an RST. 
 VATs usually encompass a much wider range of services than do RSTs, 
ranging from services associated with the purchase and use of goods (repairs, 
transportation, insurance, consulting) to a wide range of other services.  Some 
services—e.g. accounting, legal, and other professional services—are consumed 
                                                          
30 Automobile and other repairs, for example, usually require both parts (goods) and labor 
(services).  The potential for rearranging the bill to minimize tax is obviously great when only 
‘goods’ are taxed. 
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largely by firms and are creditable against output tax thus reducing cascading and 
distortionary costs.  As with freeing production inputs from tax, the more 
comprehensive VAT approach to service taxation – first taxing all services and then 
allowing legitimate business users (registered VAT payers) to credit such taxes 
against VAT due on their sales—is, experience suggests, more effective, equitable 
and efficient than the RST approach of taxing only certain specific services (dry 
cleaning, barbers, preparation of personal income tax returns) that are assumed to be 
provided mainly to consumers.   
 A 2004 survey by the Federation of Tax Administrators found that 168 
different named services were subject to RST in different U.S. states, ranging from 
only one in Alaska, which has only a local sales tax, to 160 in Hawaii, where the so-
called general ‘excise’ tax is actually imposed on ‘turnover’ or gross receipts rather 
than just on ‘retail sales’ and hence has a much broader base (as well as even more 
cascading) than the usual RST.31  Unfortunately, since many of the services taxed are  
frequently used by businesses—credit reporting, advertising, printing, computer and 
data processing, maintenance and janitorial services, etc.—the impact of including 
more services in the RST tax base has probably been to increase the extent to which 
the tax falls on business inputs rather than final consumption.32   
 In contrast, VAT both taxes a considerably wider range of services and 
clearly ‘untaxes’ services to the extent they are used by registered taxpayers for 
business purposes.  Of course, many problems remain in taxing services under a 
                                                          
31 The survey cited is reported in Tax Administrators News, vol. 69, no. 5, May 2005. Although 
State of Hawaii (2002) makes much of the difference between what Hawaii calls its ‘excise tax,’ 
which  is imposed on business, and a sales tax that would be, it assumes, imposed on consumers, 
the Hawaiian excise is of course only another variety of sales tax.  Unlike most RSTs, however, it 
is imposed at three rates: 0.15 percent on insurance commissions, 0.5 percent on wholesale sales, 
and 4 percent on retail sales.  The low rate on wholesale sales is presumably intended to reduce 
cascading.  In 2000, ‘wholesale sales’ were defined a bit more broadly to include e.g. certain 
telecommunications and transportation services in a further attempt to reduce cascading.   
32 Federation of Tax Administrators (1997) discusses the situation across states in detail.  The 
2004 survey cited above indicates have been few changes in the situation in the last few years.  
For an interesting exploration of the extent to which RSTs might be extended to encompass 
services more successfully, see Hendrix and Zodrow (2003).  As these authors note, there is a 
strong economic case for taxing more consumer services but none for taxing business services.  
They do not, perhaps, emphasize strongly enough the considerable administrative difficulties that 
arise under the RST approach in distinguishing between the two.  The ‘dual use’ system they 
suggest as a possible replacement appears to combine the problems of the VAT approach—the 
need for refunds, etc.—with those of the RST—the need to distinguish ‘dual-use’ inputs. 
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VAT, for example, with respect to financial services and cross-border services.33  In 
principle, exactly the same base could be reached equally well with a properly 
designed and administered RST.  That most RSTs do not tax services well does not 
mean that any consumption tax taking this form must inherently be similarly 
imperfect.  In practice, however, most RSTs do appear to be considerably more 
economically distorting than most VATs.34  The relatively low rates of sales taxes 
and the considerably greater availability of administrative and fiscal resources in U.S. 
states and Canadian provinces may make the resulting problems relatively tolerable 
and affordable.  Nonetheless, these problems do exist, and the result is some erosion 
of both state competitiveness and fiscal accountability.   
 
Other Economic Aspects 
 
 VAT thus wins on economic grounds.  Or does it?  When it comes to other 
factors sometimes mentioned in this connection, the case for VAT seems less strong 
than sometimes asserted by proponents.   
 
Revenue Matters 
  
 For example, while on balance the evidence is that VATs may have increased 
revenues to some extent in developed countries, this result is not all that clear—and 
indeed the opposite may have happened in some poor countries (Baunsgaard and 
Keen 2005).  VAT has certainly not proved to be a guaranteed painless ‘money 
machine’ in Canada, where both federal and provincial VATs are, like RSTs, fully 
visible to consumers (Bird, Mintz, and Wilson 2006).  The revenue yielded by any 
sales tax is the product of its base and rate.  Abstracting from administrative issues 
(and  any long-term effects on growth), the size of the respective bases depends upon:  
                                                          
33  For recent discussions of such problems in the international context, see Bird and Gendron 
(2007).  I discuss the cross-border case further below. 
34 While as is so often the case when it comes to sales taxes there is surprisingly little empirical 
evidence to support such statements, Kuo, McGirr and Poddar (1988) estimated (some aspects of) 
the distortion costs of RSTs in Canada in the 1980s.  (In an as yet unpublished update of this 
analysis for the 1990s Hasheem Nouroz has shown that these costs were indeed reduced 
substantially as a result of the (partial) adoption of the VAT at the provincial level.) 
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(1)  the extent to which business inputs are taxed under the RST and ‘untaxed’ under 
the VAT, (2) the extent to which final (consumer) services are taxed under the two 
forms of tax, and (3) the relationship between these two magnitudes for each tax.  If, 
as suggested above, more services are taxed under the VAT approach than under the 
usual RST, then arguably the elasticity of a VAT (with respect to GDP) should, other 
things being equal, be higher since the share of services in consumption usually rises 
more quickly as income rises than does the share of goods.35 However, this point, 
even if accepted, is unlikely to carry much weight.  
 
Avoiding Erosion 
 
 It is also sometimes said that an RST is more prone to ‘erosion’ by 
exemptions than a VAT.  There is no obvious reason this should be so unless one 
believes that the administrative cost of particular exemptions is relatively higher with 
an RST than that of similar exemptions under a VAT.  This issue has not been 
systematically examined by anyone.  Governments introducing any form of sales tax 
are well advised to establish as few exemptions and exceptions as possible because, 
once granted, such concessions invariably prove hard to reverse.  If, as I assume is 
probably going to be as true in the US as it has proven to be in Canada, a state VAT 
is likely to be—owing to its broader consumption base—more visible than the usual 
RST,36 one might perhaps might argue that concessions would be more likely in the 
case of the former.  The nature of a VAT, however, is such that simply ‘exempting’ 
                                                          
35 It is sometimes said that VAT confers at least a short-term revenue advantage to government 
because it ‘gets the money earlier’ (that is, in stages during the production process rather than only 
at the end when a good is finally sold to consumers).  But this argument is clearly wrong.  At the 
end of each tax period the government must (so to speak) pay back input tax credits so the net 
flow of revenue to government depends entirely on how much is collected on the final sales–that 
is, ‘sales to others than VAT registrants–taking place in the economy in that period (OECD 1988).  
If the VAT payment period is identical to the normal commercial payment period, as is often the 
case, and the level of activity of VAT taxpayers is constant over time, the same arithmetic applies 
even in the case of a single VAT taxpayer: neither she nor the government gains or loses in 
revenue terms by moving to a VAT. 
36 Much of the U.S. discussion of VAT seems to assume, without discussion, that the tax imposed 
on final sales would not be quoted separately (as with RST) but instead ‘hidden’ in the price.  It is 
true this is the practice in most countries.  However, it is not in Canada, where the VATs, both 
federal and provincial, are quoted separately exactly like RSTs.  It seems more reasonable to 
expect this to be the case also in the U.S. than to assume that the wholesale adoption of a new 
‘hidden’ tax at the state level would be acceptable.  
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any activity from VAT will leave it subject to ‘partial’ taxation because it will pay tax 
on its inputs but be unable to credit them against output taxes.   
 To be really exempt from a VAT one has to be ‘taxed’ by it—but at a rate of 
zero!  Such ‘zero-rating’ is administratively complex, in effect requiring the tax 
administration to spend a lot of time and effort handing out refunds and policing them 
to ensure that ‘cheats don’t prosper.’  States considering VATs would be well-
advised to keep zero-rating to an absolute minimum, which means confining it only 
to exports, as discussed below.37  The only way in which effective ‘exemptions’—
that is, zero-rating—can be granted under a VAT to any good or service without 
messing up the whole system is by limiting the zero-rating to the final sales of 
specifically identified products (e.g. school books).  Even then it is a far more 
cumbersome and costly process for both business and government than a simple RST 
exemption. 38  VAT is a tax that works best without exemptions.  Still, although the 
very ‘nature of the (VAT) beast’ makes it more difficult to create concessions than 
with an RST, it is far from clear what the end result of a VAT-RST substitution 
would be in this respect.   
   
Making Administration Simpler 
 
 Much the same can be said of another and even more common argument, that 
VAT is easier to administer because it is ‘self-enforcing.’  No tax is self-enforcing.  
The argument to the contrary sometimes made with respect to VAT rests on the fact 
that the output tax payable by one firm is to some extent another’s creditable input 
tax.  As mentioned earlier, firms may thus have conflicting interests—one to under-
report (output tax) and the other to over-report (input tax)—and the result may be, on 
balance, more accurate reporting.  If sellers and purchasers were (1) equally liable for 
each other’s accurate tax reporting and hence concerned to police each other’s 
honesty and (2) subjected to a credible threat of monitoring by the tax authorities, this  
                                                          
37 As Gendron (2005) discusses, and as New Zealand and to some extent Canada does in practice, 
a good case can be made for ‘zero-rating’ some public sector activities, but I cannot go into all 
these details—and the concomitant complexities—here.  The case for severely restricting zero-
rating is developed in Bird and Gendron (2007). 
38 The province of Quebec, for example, provides some ‘exemption’ (zero-rating) for certain 
printed materials. 
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argument might perhaps carry some weight.  As a rule, however, neither party is 
liable for errors of either commission or omission by the other party in the 
transaction.39  With a VAT, as with an RST, effective tax auditing is a sine qua non. 
VAT does have some administrative advantages over an RST, but as discussed below 
these advantages are not as decisive as is often asserted by pro-VAT zealots.  
 
Reducing Evasion 
 
 Finally, although it has often been suggested that VAT is a more effective 
way to reach the so-called ‘informal’ sector, this too is hardly a proven reality.  The 
extent to which any form of consumption tax reaches the elusive denizens of the 
‘hidden’ economy is a function of both design and—especially—administration.  In 
practice,  however,  it  is perhaps plausible that the VAT approach, which taxes inputs 
when they leave the organized formal sector rather than trying to capture the whole 
tax base on the final informal sale, may be somewhat more effective than even the 
best achievable RST in reaching this hard-to-tax sector (Bird and Wallace 2004).   
 
                                                          
39 This is a complex question that has been much discussed in the E.U., for example, but in 
Canada, at least so far, the situation is as stated in the text – which is also, of course, the situation 
with most RSTs in both Canada and the U.S. 
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IV. Administrative Aspects of Tax Choice 
 
 On balance, then, even discounting some common exaggerations, the 
economic advantages seem clearly on the side of VAT.  As just discussed, however, 
the issue is less clear with respect to the administrative dimension of tax choice.   
 
The Number of Taxpayers 
 
 Some think, for example, that a major difference between a VAT and an RST 
is that the former requires dealing with a much larger number of taxpayers.  Any form 
of general tax on final consumption does require dealing with considerably more 
taxpayers than does, say, a manufacturer’s sales tax.  However, VAT does not require 
dealing with many more registered entities than an equally tightly-controlled RST.  
The issue cannot be settled by simple comparisons between the number of ‘retailers’ 
and the total number of firms in any jurisdiction.  The former number is by definition 
smaller, but this does not mean VAT is more administratively demanding than a retail 
sales tax.  Not only ‘retailers’ make ‘retail sales.’  Since manufacturers (e.g. Dell) and 
importers and other distributors to business (e.g. big ‘box’ outlets such as Home 
Deport or Costco) also sell directly to consumers, they too should be registered for 
RST purposes.  In addition, as mentioned earlier, if an RST is administered as tightly 
as VAT a substantial number of ‘non-taxpayers’ should be registered to ensure 
adequate audit control of ‘tax-free’ sales—although, as noted, this is seldom done. 
Finally, although this point is not discussed further here, VATs usually ‘exempt’ 
firms below a certain size from registration and thus from both paying VAT on sales 
and crediting VAT on purchases.40  In contrast, in principle RSTs subject all ‘retail’ 
sellers to tax.  The ‘number’ issue is thus by no means a cut-and-dried ‘RST wins’ 
proposition. 
 VAT and RST are identical in one important respect.  Both operate by 
distinguishing between those who are ‘inside’ the system and those ‘outside’ the 
system.  An RST ‘suspends’ tax on sales between those inside the system and taxes 
sales to those outside.  A VAT taxes all sales but then credits taxes levied on sales 
                                                          
40 See Keen and Mintz (2004) for a careful evaluation of the optimal threshold level—probably 
(very roughly) around $100,000 or more in U.S. conditions, although of course this question needs 
much closer study. 
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made ‘inside’ the system (input tax credits) against taxes levied on those made 
outside (output taxes).  If the tax base is the same—same items taxed, same 
exemptions, etc.—and the two taxes are administered equally effectively, then 
exactly the same entities (including those ‘exempt’ under an RST) should be ‘inside’, 
that is, registered (or otherwise recognized) for sales tax purposes.  However, in 
practice most RST jurisdictions do not really follow this path.  Instead, they 
download the task of dealing with exempt purchasers (other than ‘tax-free’ sales to 
other registered firms) to sellers.  Since sellers seldom bear any liability for mistakes, 
intentional or otherwise, that they may make in determining which buyers are 
legitimately exempt, this way of operating a sales tax is obviously vulnerable to 
fraud.   
 On the whole, provided the same level of administrative control is achieved 
under both systems, there should be little difference in the number of firms to be dealt 
with under either the VAT or RST form of consumption tax,  
 
Public and Private Administration 
 
 In practice there are often important differences in the nature and scope of the 
tasks facing the tax administration dealing with a VAT rather than an RST.  
Interestingly, since a common argument against VAT is that it would be too costly to 
administer, one such difference is that in fact the VAT approach downloads much of 
the burden of administration to the private sector.  For example, under an RST if a 
registered entity purchases a product, no tax is collected.  For the tax administration 
to determine if tax should have been collected it must determine the facts of the case: 
was the purchaser a legitimate (licensed) activity and did it put the product purchased 
to a legitimate use?  If some impropriety is uncovered, it is up to the authorities to 
chase down the guilty and attempt to collect any tax due.  This is not easy, and it is 
not surprising that most RST administrations seem to do little along these lines.  All 
the cost is borne by them and successful outcomes are elusive. 
 With a VAT, tax is collected on many more transactions, and the government 
keeps the revenue unless the taxpayer demonstrates both that he is a legitimate 
taxpayer and that he has a legitimate claim to credit against tax due on his sales.  The 
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onus is on the taxpayer, not the government, to act.  If the government doubts the 
legitimacy of a claim for credit, it can demand documentation (invoices) that by law 
must be maintained by the taxpayer.  Further, it may also follow the chain of invoices 
by using documentation that should be readily available—and if it is not available, 
the game is over for the taxpayer.  Life for tax administrators may thus in some 
respects be somewhat easier under a VAT than an RST.  The obverse, however, is 
that VAT is correspondingly more onerous for taxpayers who must maintain more 
records to aid the hand that smites them.   
 Sandford et al. (1981) argued that anyone who runs a sound business needs to 
maintain ‘VAT-like’ records in any case so that imposing a VAT may even yield so-
called ‘management benefits’ by encouraging businesses to do their job better.  Such 
minor consolations are unlikely to cut much ice with taxpayers faced with what 
undoubtedly is perceived by them to be a new and onerous fiscal obligation.  
Complaints are likely to be particularly great from smaller firms for which the fixed 
costs of establishing required new accounting or reporting systems constitute a 
proportionately greater burden (Cnossen 1994).  However, since if anyone ever 
actually tried to administer an RST at the standards of the average VAT taxpayers 
would presumably be required to maintain exactly the same records, this particular 
‘anti-VAT’ argument should be regarded with some skepticism.  The major 
‘additional’ cost of a VAT is the need to provide rebates of input taxes in some cases, 
particularly with respect to new investment when firms expand and, especially, with 
respect to sales out-of-state.  Since the latter point has often been said to render a 
state VAT unworkable in the U.S. (Due and Mikesell 1994), I focus in the next 
section on the ‘border’ issue that some consider critical. 
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V. Border Issues 
 
 A final set of policy-cum-administrative issues that arise in choosing which 
form of general sales tax makes most sense in any particular context may be (loosely) 
labeled ‘border issues.’  ‘Borders’ may arise not just between taxing jurisdictions but 
between classes of taxpayers and types of transactions.  For example, as Bird (2005b) 
shows, VAT is clearly better than RST when it comes to ‘e-commerce’ not because it 
can tax direct sales to consumers effectively—it is no better (or worse) than RST in 
this respect—but because it is more effective in relieving business inputs from tax 
and thus reducing the economic distortions created by so-called ‘consumption’ taxes 
that in practice actually tax much production (as do most RSTs).  I shall focus here, 
however, on geographical borders, an issue that looms large in sub-national 
jurisdictions like states that by definition do not control their frontiers. 
As is well known, two states (Michigan and New Hampshire) already have a 
sort of VAT, although neither of them calls their levy by this name nor seems very 
keen about the tax in question.  I said earlier that these taxes are so different from the 
sort of VAT discussed here that the Michigan and New Hampshire experiences offer 
no relevant lessons.  On the other hand, two other states (Mississippi and Louisiana) 
already do have an important ‘VAT-like’ element in their RSTs, although neither 
they nor others seem to have quite realized it yet.  In the case of Louisiana, for 
example, ‘wholesalers’—a term that includes manufacturers, jobber and suppliers 
selling to anyone for sale at retail—are required to collect advance sales taxes from 
such purchasers.  Retailers who have made such advance payments can then deduct 
such payments from the tax they collect on their own sales, provided that the 
deductions are supported by invoices from wholesalers showing the advance 
payment.41   This is of course exactly the way a VAT works.  
 As Canadian experience demonstrates, even a full-fledged invoice-credit 
VAT can work well at the sub-national level in the right conditions (Bird and 
Gendron 1998).  For domestic sales provincial VATs in Canada work exactly like the 
Louisiana tax.  For cross-border (out-of-province) purchases, taxes are not collected 
on imports except with respect to international imports, where the Canada Border 
                                                          
41 For a description of the Louisiana tax, see U.S. Chamber of Commerce (2004)  
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Services Agency (CBSA) has made arrangements with most provinces to collect 
provincial sales taxes (regardless whether they are imposed in VAT or RST form) on 
imports for final consumption.42  For imports by final consumers (or non-registrants) 
from other provinces, provincial sales taxes rely on provisions similar to, and 
probably no more effective than, the so-called ‘use tax’ common in the U.S.43  
However, ‘commercial’ imports made by registered importers are not subject to any 
provincial tax on import from other provinces or from abroad.  Tax on such imports 
is in effect ‘deferred’ until resale.  In short, provincial VATs in effect act just like a 
‘suspended’ RST in the sense that tax is deferred at import and collected on the first 
subsequent taxable transaction.  This ‘deferred VAT’ procedure is exactly how VAT 
has long worked in some European countries with respect to cross-border transactions 
(Cnossen and Shoup 1987).44  
 Sub-national jurisdictions thus get around the lack of border control when it 
comes to taxing imports not by attempting to collect the tax at the border (since they 
cannot do so) but instead trying to collect it on the first taxable transaction after the 
border.  This is how an RST works; it is also how a VAT works.  Since the ‘deferred 
VAT’ procedure is conceptually identical to the ‘suspended RST’ procedure, it raises 
similar problems.  On the import side, the problems facing state sales taxes thus differ 
little whether the state has an RST or a VAT, with the important exception that under 
a VAT firms importing goods or services from out-of-state suppliers cannot, of 
course, offset ‘input VAT’ against VAT due on their own sales as they can with 
respect to ‘in-state’ purchases. That is, even with a VAT, consumers can still dodge 
(some) tax by buying out of state, but businesses cannot.   
 Matters are different when it comes to exports, however, although the balance 
when it comes to choosing between VAT and RST is by no means clear. Under an 
RST goods exported from the jurisdiction are not taxed but tax elements may be 
included as a result of prior taxes on inputs.  Canadian estimates (for RSTs very like 
                                                          
42 See Canada Border Services Agency <http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/menu-e.html>  Provincial 
taxes are also applied by CBSA to goods delivered by courier or post, subject to a de minimis rule.   
43 Bird and Gendron (1998) argue that this process may be somewhat more effective in provinces 
with VATs because the over-arching national VAT (the GST) and agreements between the federal 
and provincial authorities permit information exchange and therefore more effective audits. 
44 As mentioned earlier, many in the E.U. are not all that happy with how that system is currently 
working but as yet no viable replacement has been developed. 
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those in most U.S. states) suggest that about 30 percent of RSTs ‘cascade’ through to 
export prices (Kuo, Poddar and McGirr 1988).  In contrast, under a VAT taxes 
previously paid on inputs would be credited and in many cases refunded: no such 
burden is imposed on state exports.   
 This economic advantage, however, may be counterbalanced to some extent 
by a potentially serious administrative problem.  Under a VAT, an input tax credit 
(for VAT paid on business inputs) is conceptually equivalent to a check drawn on the 
Treasury but issued by the private sector.  There is thus an obvious temptation for an 
unscrupulous firm to exploit an unwary administration by reporting fraudulent (or 
over-valued) exports.  Nonetheless, even in these cases VAT should provide a clearer 
‘audit trail’ than an RST.  Regardless of the form of a sales tax, it is always difficult 
to verify the reality and value of exports reported by taxpayers especially when there 
are no physical border controls or even (as with digital commerce) no physical 
transaction.  Consumers who buy out of state (or simply pretend to do so e.g. by 
giving a false address or having goods delivered to their cousin in the next state) can 
cheat with respect to VAT as with respect to RST.  However, the temptation to cheat 
may be perhaps greater with VAT for business owing to the possibility of securing a 
refund—though of course the chance of being caught is also greater. Canadian 
experience to date suggests that interstate sales create few if any more problems for a 
VAT than an RST, but it is not yet entirely clear to what, if any, extent this happy 
outcome depends upon the existence of a federal VAT in Canada.  It is, I think, this 
issue above all that likely needs close and detailed consideration by any state that 
might consider replacing its VAT by an RST.  
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VI. Conclusion: The Selling of the VAT 
 
 To conclude, VAT wins economically as the best form of state consumption 
tax, and, at least arguably, should do as well or better administratively.  In the end, 
therefore, as indeed is usually the case with taxing matters, the answer to the question 
posed in the title of this paper lies in political hands.  Can those who believe that a 
state VAT would make sense persuade enough people to agree with them to make it 
worth taking the chance?  How, in other words, can a state VAT along the lines 
sketched here be sold as what it really is: not a demonic ‘money machine’ but simply 
a better way of taxing consumption than an RST?  While the answer to this question 
obviously rests in the hands of political marketers, perhaps a few comments might 
help to suggest the kind of sales strategy that may work, at least in some cases. 
 One obvious approach is not to call it a VAT.  In fact, why call “it” anything?  
All one needs to do to achieve the economically most relevant gain from moving to a 
VAT is to reduce substantially the extent to which the present RST taxes business 
inputs.  This could be done simply by introducing an expanded version of the 
‘advance payment’ system used in Louisiana.  This is not a second-best solution since 
moving even part of the way in the right direction is clearly an economic gain.  
Business should like such a system, even if – as should be the case – such a move 
were to be accompanied by a complete revamping of the sales tax registry system in 
order to keep tight control over the new ‘withholding’ (partial payment) system of the 
existing tax.  
 The more difficult problem is how to make up any revenue lost by removing 
the tax on business inputs.45  The options within the sales tax framework are to raise 
the rate, or—and this is the best option both economically and administratively—to 
expand the base to encompass a wide range of services, or some mixture of both.  
Any change is likely to be unpopular, and no one is likely to believe that the state 
government will not be sneakily raising new revenue through its new and improved 
sales tax.  The government will thus have to deal with strong popular reactions to 
what most citizens will almost certainly consider to be a new—and of course 
                                                          
45 As noted earlier, it is of course possible – as seems true in the Canadian case (Smart 2007) – 
that there may be little revenue loss, although this remains a matter for close study in any state 
contemplating the VAT option. 
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unpopular – tax on at least some consumer services.  While no ‘cookbook’ solutions 
come to mind, a few possible approaches may perhaps be suggested: 
 
● For example, every effort might be made both to reassure the public that the 
government is watching out carefully for “exploitation” in the form of 
unwarranted price increases and to inform them of the expected reductions 
over time one might expect in the prices of some “big ticket” items (e.g. cars 
and appliances).46  
  
● In addition, because the effects of a revenue-neutral change are likely to be 
slightly regressive (Smart 2007), perhaps income tax credits to low-income 
consumers (and welfare payments) might be increased a bit.47   
 
● Perhaps more importantly from a political perspective, to offset fears of a 
‘revenue grab’ the government might bind itself to use any increment over 
revenue expected from the former tax to cut tax rates, pay down debt, build 
roads, fund education, or whatever it is that people seem to want.48  
 
● Finally, the introduction of taxes on services might perhaps be made more 
palatable by following a phase-in approach, with, for instance, services being 
subject to only (say) a 50 percent discounted rate initially—financed perhaps 
by restricting to some extent the input tax credits that can be claimed by 
larger firms.  At a later date, once the new tax is accepted, it may then be 
possible to make the tax rate on services and goods uniform.49   
 
 No doubt those more versed in the political game than I am can come up with 
many other approaches to the ‘selling of VAT’ if only they were convinced that the 
economic gains of the switch advocated here were worthwhile and the strategy 
proposed a workable one.  In any case, fifteen years of successful experience with 
provincial VATs north of the border suggests that it is perhaps time for at least some 
                                                          
46 In Canada, the federal government set up a special office to investigate alleged ‘unwarranted’ 
price increases as a result of the tax.  Unsurprisingly, almost none were discovered. 
47 Both of these steps were taken in the Canadian case: an existing income credit to low-income 
taxpayers was enriched as were transfer payments.  Of course, any such offsets need to be taken 
into account in estimating the budgetary impact of substituting a VAT for an RST. 
48 While the provinces did not do this in Canada, the federal government, in response to public 
outrage at the ‘new’ tax, bound itself to channel any ‘additional’ funds (in excess of the 
predecessor sales tax) to a newly-created “Deficit Reduction Fund” to be used to write down the 
public debt, which was then (1991) at the top of public fiscal concerns.  In the event, the revenue 
estimators were right: there turned out to be few ‘excess’ tax dollars to flow into this fund. 
49 This is essentially how the province of Quebec in Canada introduced its provincial VAT.  A 
danger of this approach is that, as in Quebec, the temptation to maintain restrictions on input 
credits for revenue reasons might be too great: some such restrictions still remain in that province, 
to the detriment of its competitive position. 
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of the 45 states with retail sales taxes to contemplate moving into the 21st century by 
beginning to explore more seriously the possibility of adopting state VATs. 
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